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Abstract
A new coalitional value is proposed under the hypothesis of isolated
unions. The main difference between this value and the Aumann–Dre`ze
value is that the allocations within each union are not given by the Shap-
ley value of the restricted game but proportionally to the Shapley value of
the original game. Axiomatic characterizations of the new value, examples
illustrating its application and a comparative discussion are provided.
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1 Introduction
The cooperative game theory deals with situations where a group of agents (play-
ers) want to share the benefits derived from their cooperation. It offers mathemat-
ical tools to propose, according to different criteria, allocation vectors that could
be acceptable for the agents. This theory has given rise to relevant applications in
many fields (see e.g. Fiestras–Janeiro et al., 2011).
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Among those mathematical tools there are the so–called values. A value pro-
poses for every cooperative game an allocation vector that represents a fair com-
promise for the players. Probably, the most important value is the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953), denoted here by Φ. Moretti and Patrone (2008) is a survey that
shows the impact of the Shapley value in several scientific disciplines.
The notion of cooperative game with a coalition structure (a partition of the
set N of players into unions) was considered in Aumann and Dre`ze (1974), and a
modification of the Shapley value was proposed. Later on, other coalitional values
(i.e. values for cooperative games with a coalition structure) have been introduced
and analyzed in the game theoretical literature. The two most cited coalitional
values are the Aumann–Dre`ze value, denoted here by α, and the Owen value
(Owen, 1977), denoted here by Ω. They are based on two different interpretations
of the coalition structure that give rise to two different approaches when defining
coalitional values:
1. Aumann and Dre`ze consider that, once a partition {P1, . . . ,Pm} of N has
been formed, m independent cooperative situations arise (isolated unions),
so their value allocates the benefits generated by each Pk to its members by
applying the Shapley value to the restricted game.
2. Instead, Owen considers the partition rather as a way to influence the nego-
tiation among the agents (bargaining unions), so his value allocates the ben-
efits generated by N by applying the Shapley value twice: first, to sharing
the total utility among the unions and, then, to sharing among the members
of each union the payoff obtained in the first step.1
Example 1 (A glove game)
To illustrate both approaches, let us consider an elementary glove game with three
players where player 1 has two right gloves and players 2 and 3 have one left
glove each. Only each left–and–right pair of gloves has a worth of 1; otherwise,
the worth is 0. The cooperative game v associated to this situation is given by
v( /0) = v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = v({2,3}) = 0,
1The first sharing takes place in the quotient game, played by unions; the second sharing applies
to games defined in each Pk that we will not describe. We refer the reader to Owen (1977).
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v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = 1, v(N) = 2.
Consider now that partition P = {{1,2},{3}} forms. The Aumann–Dre`ze
value yields the allocation α(v,P) = (1/2,1/2,0). Indeed, once P is formed, this
value merely takes into account that players 1 and 2 are symmetric (in P1) and
must share 1 unit, whereas player 3 is a null player (in P3). Instead, the Owen
value yields the allocation Ω(v,P) = (1,1/2,1/2). It first allocates to the unions
3/2 and 1/2, respectively, and assigns then 1 to player 1, 1/2 to player 2, and 1/2
to player 3. Note that the shared worth is different.
In this paper we adopt approach 1, thus leaving aside the Owen value defi-
nitely, and introduce a new coalitional value, called the proportional partitional
Shapley value and denoted as pi, as an alternative to the Aumann–Dre`ze value.
Hence we assume that, once a partition forms, a new cooperative situation arises
in each union independently of the remaining ones. However, we wish to take
into account in some manner the outside options of the players, reflected by the
Shapley value of the original game. More precisely, given a cooperative game v in
N with a coalition structure P = {P1, . . . ,Pm}, our value divides each worth v(Pk)
among the players in Pk proportionally to the Shapley value of these players in
game v.
Thus, in Example 1 we obtain the allocation pi(v,P) = (2/3,1/3,0) since the
Shapley value is Φ(v)= (1,1/2,1/2). It reflects that player 1 is in a better position
than player 2 because he might join player 3 if {1,2} collapses. We will restrict
the domain of our value to the class of monotonic games in order to avoid some
problems that often arise when using proportionality.
Example 2 (A second glove game)2
Let N = {r,r, `, `,`,`} be, informally, the set of players, each one with a glove:
r means righty, ` means lefty. Only each left–and–right pair of gloves has a worth
of one. The glove game v describing this is a linear combination of 45 unanimity
games that we omit. The Shapley value is
Φ(v) =
1
15(11,11,2,2,2,2)
2We are grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this numerical example.
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and, for any partition P = {A, . . .}, where A = {r,r, `}, the Aumann–Dre`ze and
proportional partitional Shapley values respectively yield
α(v,P) =
1
6(1,1,4,0,0,0) and pi(v,P) =
1
24
(11,11,2,0,0,0).
These allocations do not depend on the way the remaining three players ` are
arranged (a general property of α and pi). Instead, for the Owen value, this greatly
matters. There are three possibilities:
P1 = {A,{`},{`},{`}}, P2 = {A,B,{`}} and P3 = {A,C},
where B = {`,`} and C = {`,`,`}. Thus for the Owen value we obtain
Ω(v,P1) = 112(9,9,3,1,1,1), Ω(v,P
2) = 136(25,25,10,3,3,6), and
Ω(v,P3) = 112(7,7,4,2,2,2).
This example is interesting. First, because it shows a difference between the
Aumann–Dre`ze value and the proportional partitional Shapley value: the former
is concerned with the possibilities existing in A = {r,r, `} only, and hence it gives
the bulk of the payoff to player `; instead, the latter recalls the strategic strength
in the original game, thus avoiding a striking change in the payout ratios that
would not satisfy the righties. Second, it shows the main difference between the
Aumann–Dre`ze and proportional partitional Shapley values and the Owen value.
The former two satisfy local efficiency, whereas the latter satisfies efficiency, as
the Shapley value does.
The background for our new coalitional value shares ideas with the propor-
tional coalitional Shapley value (Alonso–Meijide and Carreras, 2011), which fol-
lows approach 2. In Wiese (2007) and Casajus (2009) other variations of the
Aumann–Dre`ze value can be found that also take into account, in a way different
from ours, the players’ outside options.
The organization of the paper is as follows. We assume that the reader is
generally familiar with the basic ideas of the cooperative game theory (including
simple games) and omit, therefore, a preliminary section. In Section 2 we for-
mally define the Aumann–Dre`ze value and the proportional partitional Shapley
value and study the properties of the latter. Section 3 includes several examples
to illustrate the use of this new value. Section 4 is devoted to some comparative
discussion and final remarks.
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2 The proportional partitional Shapley value
Let N = {1,2, . . . ,n} represent a finite but otherwise arbitrary set of players. We
will consider TU games only (just “games”, in the sequel). The vector space
of games in N will be denoted as G(N), and as MG(N) the subclass (cone) of
monotonic games, which will be the domain of our new value. The set of partitions
(coalition structures) in N will be denoted as P(N).
For every nonempty coalition T ⊆ N, the unanimity game uT is defined by
uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S or else uT (S) = 0. Every game v ∈ MG(N) can be uniquely
written as a linear combination of unanimity games using the Harsanyi dividends
(Harsanyi, 1959):
v = ∑
T⊆N : T 6= /0
cT uT where cT = ∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv(S), t = |T |, s = |S|.
The following relationship among monotonic games will be useful later:
v+ v− = v+ where v+ = ∑
T : cT>0
cT uT and v− = ∑
T : cT<0
−cT uT .
The Shapley value is the map Φ : G(N)→ RN defined by
Φi(v) = ∑
S⊆N\{i}
s!(n− s−1)!
n!
[v(S∪{i})− v(S)],
for all v ∈ G(N) and i ∈ N, where s = |S| for every S ⊆ N.
The Shapley value is the only value on MG(N) that satisfies the following
properties3:
• Efficiency: ∑
i∈N
Φi(v) = v(N) for all v ∈MG(N).
• Null player property4: if i is null in v then Φi(v) = 0.
• Symmetry: if i, j are symmetric in v then Φi(v) = Φ j(v).
• Additivity: Φ(v+w) = Φ(v)+Φ(w) for all v,w ∈MG(N).
3An analogous characterization holds in G(N).
4It is noteworthy that, if v ∈ MG(N), then Φi(v) = 0 if, and only if, i is a null player in v, so
that the null player property could be so stated for Φ in this subclass of games.
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Now, we introduce two key concepts for this paper: those of partitional value,
using local efficiency, and partitional Shapley value, as a generalization of the
Shapley value. We state them for G(N) but will use both notions also in MG(N).
Definition 3 A partitional value on G(N) is a map φ : G(N)×P(N)→ RN such
that
∑
i∈Pk
φi(v,P) = v(Pk)
for all v ∈ G(N), P ∈ P(N) and Pk ∈ P (we call this local efficiency).
Definition 4 A partitional Shapley value on G(N) is a partitional value φ on G(N)
such that φ(v,PN) = Φ(v) for all v ∈ G(N).5
We next recall the Aumann–Dre`ze value (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974) and in-
troduce the proportional partitional Shapley value.
Definition 5 The Aumann–Dre`ze value is the partitional Shapley value α defined
on G(N) by
αi(v,P) = Φi(vP(i))
for all v ∈ G(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N, where P(i) denotes the union of P to which
i belongs, and vP(i) denotes the restriction of game v to P(i).
Definition 6 The proportional partitional Shapley value is the partitional Shapley
value pi defined on MG(N) by
pii(v,P) =

Φi(v)
∑ j∈P(i) Φ j(v)
v(P(i)) if i is not a null player in v,
0 otherwise,
for all v ∈ MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N, where P(i) denotes again the union of P
to which i belongs.
The definition makes sense because, if i is not null in a monotonic game v,
then Φi(v)> 0 and hence the denominator does not vanish.
Our next goal will consist in establishing the basic properties of the new value
and obtaining two axiomatic characterizations, which will be discussed in Section
4. We first state these properties for a generic partition value φ on MG(N).
5PN denotes the trivial partition {N}.
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• Nonnegativity (NN): φi(v,P)≥ 0 for all v ∈MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N.
• Null player property (NPP): if i is null in v then φi(v,P)= 0 for all P∈P(N).
• Symmetry within unions (SWU): if i, j ∈N are symmetric in v and P(i) = P( j)
then φi(v,P) = φ j(v,P).
• Proportionality within unions (PWU): if i, j ∈ N and P(i) = P( j) then, for all
v ∈MG(N),
φi(v,P)φ j(v,PN) = φ j(v,P)φi(v,PN).
• Weighted additivity (WA)6: for all v,w ∈MG(N) and P ∈ P(N),
hφ(v+w,P) = hφ(v,P)+hφ(w,P),
where, for all i ∈ N and v ∈MG(N),
hφi (v,P) =
 φi(v,P)
∑ j∈P(i) φ j(v,PN)
v(P(i))
if v(P(i))> 0,
φi(v,PN) if v(P(i)) = 0.
The next results provide alternative characterizations of the new value.
Theorem 7 (First axiomatic characterization of the proportional partitional Shap-
ley value) The proportional partitional Shapley value pi is the unique partitional
Shapley value on MG(N) that satisfies NPP and PWU.
Proof. (Existence) It is straightforward to check that pi is a partitional Shapley
value on MG(N) that satisfies NPP7 and PWU.
(Uniqueness) Let φ be a partitional Shapley value on MG(N) satisfying NPP
and PWU. We show that φ = pi. Let v ∈MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N.
• If i is a null player in v, then φi(v,P) = 0 = pii(v,P) since φ and pi satisfy
NPP.
• If P(i) = {i}, then φi(v,P) = v({i}) = pii(v,P) since φ and pi are partitional
values.
6This property recalls the classical additivity for φ: the difference lies in the attached weights.
7pi also satisfies a null player strong property (NPP*): pii(v,P) = 0 iff i is null in v or v(P(i)) = 0.
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• If every j ∈ P(i) different from i is a null player, then φi(v,P) = v({i}) =
pii(v,P) since φ and pi are partitional values and satisfy NPP.
• In any other case, take j ∈ P(i) such that j is not a null player. Then, since φ
and pi are partitional Shapley values and satisfy PWU,
φi(v,P)
φ j(v,P) =
Φi(v)
Φ j(v)
=
pii(v,P)
pi j(v,P)
.
This means that φ j(v,P) = λpi j(v,P) for every non–null player j ∈ P(i),
where λ is a constant which does not depend on j. Since φ and pi are parti-
tional values, it is clear that λ = 1, and hence φi(v,P) = pii(v,P).
We conclude that φ = pi. 
Theorem 8 (Second axiomatic characterization of the proportional partitional
Shapley value) The proportional partitional Shapley value pi is the unique parti-
tional value on MG(N) that satisfies NN, NPP, SWU and WA.
Proof. (Existence) Again, it is straightforward to check that pi satisfies NN, NPP
and SWU. We proceed to prove WA. Let v ∈MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N.
• If i is a null player and v(P(i)) = 0, then hpii (v,P) = pii(v,PN) = 0 = Φi(v)
since pi is a partitional Shapley value.
• If i is a null player and v(P(i))> 0, then by NPP hpii (v,P) = 0 = Φi(v).
• If i is not a null player and v(P(i)) = 0, then hpii (v,P) = pii(v,PN) = Φi(v)
because pi is a partitional Shapley value.
• Finally, if i is not a null player and v(P(i))> 0, by the definition of pi, which
is a partitional Shapley value, we get
hpii (v,P) =
Φi(v)
∑ j∈P(i) Φ j(v)
v(P(i))
∑ j∈P(i) pi j(v,PN)
v(P(i))
= Φi(v)
∑ j∈P(i) Φ j(v)
∑ j∈P(i) Φ j(v)
which reduces to Φi(v).
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Summing up, we find hpi(v,P) = Φ(v) for all v ∈ MG(N). Therefore, the re-
lationship hpi(v+w,P) = hpi(v,P)+ hpi(w,P) for any v,w ∈ MG(N) follows from
the additivity of Φ.
(Uniqueness) Let φ be a partitional value on MG(N) satisfying NN, NPP, SWU
and WA. We show that φ is determined. Let v ∈MG(N) and P ∈ P(N).
• If v = 0 then, by NPP, φi(v,P) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
• Let uT be the unanimity game for a given nonempty coalition T ⊆ N. Let
v = cuT with c > 0 and Tk = T ∩Pk for each Pk ∈ P. If i /∈ T then i is a
null player in v and φi(v,P) = 0 by NPP. Let Tk 6= /0. Since φ is a partitional
value,
∑
i∈Pk
φi(v,P) = ∑
i∈Tk
φi(v,P) = v(Pk) = cuT (Pk),
and hence
∑
i∈Pk
φi(v,P) =
{
c if T ⊆ Pk,
0 otherwise.
Since all players in Tk are symmetric in v, by SWU we have
φi(v,P) =
{
c/tk if i ∈ T and T ⊆ Pk,
0 otherwise,
for all i ∈ Pk, where tk = |Tk|. This determines φ in this case.
• Let P = PN and i ∈ N. It is clear that P(i) = N. Let v be any game. If
v(N) = 0 then hφi (v,PN) = φi(v,PN). If, instead, v(N)> 0, using that φ is a
partitional value we have
hφi (v,P
N) = φi(v,PN)∑ j∈N
φ j(v,PN)
v(N)
= φi(v,PN).
From WA it follows that φ(v+w,PN) = φ(v,PN)+ φ(w,PN) for all v,w ∈
MG(N). Then, if we consider φ as a function only of v, once P = PN has
been fixed, it is easily seen that φ satisfies efficiency, the null player prop-
erty, symmetry and additivity, and the uniqueness of the Shapley value gives
φ(v,PN) = Φ(v) for all v ∈MG(N).
• Let v=∑r`=1 v` in MG(N) and i∈N. (a) If v(P(i)) = 0 then φi(v,P) = 0 since
φ is a partitional value satisfying NN. (b) If v(P(i))> 0, let R = {1,2, . . . ,r},
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R+ = {`∈ R : v`(P(i))> 0} and R0 = R\R+, so R0 = {`∈ R : v`(P(i)) = 0}
because v` is monotonic. By WA we have
φi(v,P)
∑ j∈P(i) φ j(v,PN)
v(P(i))
=
∑
`∈R+
φi(v`,P)
∑ j∈P(i) φ j(v`,PN)
v`(P(i))
+ ∑
`∈R0
φi(v`,PN).
By the previous item, ∑ j∈P(i) φ j(v,PN) = ∑ j∈P(i) Φ j(v), which is positive
since v(P(i)) > 0 implies that some j ∈ P(i) is not null in v (recall footnote
4). Thus, if φi(v`,P) is uniquely determined for all `∈ R+ then so is φi(v,P)
by solving the above equation for it.
• Finally, let v ∈ MG(N) and P ∈ P(N) be arbitrary. Using v+ v− = v+, the
decomposition of v+ and v− as linear combinations of unanimity games, and
the preceding item, it follows that φ is completely determined on (v+,P) and
(v−,P) and hence on (v,P). 
3 Several examples
We sketch here some applications of the proportional partitional Shapley value.
Example 9 (Allocating primary assistance centres)
Due to budget constraints, the National Health Ministry (NHM) of a country re-
stricts the creation of primary assistance centres (PACs) in regions with low popu-
lation (< 50000 inhabitants). Villages in such a region are allowed to freely form
disjoint unions, and only unions with at least 5000 inhabitants will obtain a PAC.
The final decision will be the location of the PAC for each such union. It will
be placed on the centre of gravity of the concerned villages, which minimizes the
weighted sum of squares of distances and is easy to compute; however, the “mass”
attached to each village will not be its population but a different parameter related
to it.
To fix ideas, let A(0,0), B(3,0), C(4,1), D(3,3) and E(1,3) be the locations of
the five villages 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of a region (see Fig. 1), and 4230, 3160, 2120,
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2005 and 1355 be, respectively, their populations (in all, 12870 inhabitants). The
NHM takes into account the weighted majority game
v≡ [5000;4230,3160,2120,2005,1355]
(a simple but improper, i.e. not superadditive, game) because the unions that
would get a PAC constitute, precisely, the family of winning coalitions in v:
W (v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{1,5},{2,3},{2,4},{3,4,5}, and supersets}.
Since small differences between populations are considered not meaningful, in or-
der to locate PACS the NHM prefers using parameters proportional to the Shapley
value of this game, which disregards irrelevant weight differences and is given by
Φ(v) = 112(4,3,2,2,1).
However, at the end all will depend on the arrangement of villages into unions.
Then, the NHM needs some coalitional value to attach weights and to compute
centres of gravity. Once the unions are formed, the process stops since they are
not interested in a further bargaining “at a higher level”, so the Owen value is not
suitable here. The alternative consists in using either the Aumann–Dre`ze value or
the proportional partitional Shapley value that we have introduced in the previous
section.
Requirements such as the reduction to the Shapley value whenever the parti-
tion is P = PN , the null player property, symmetry within unions, and local effi-
ciency make sense and are easily interpretable in this context, but they are satisfied
by both values. Instead, the crucial property of interest for the NHM is proportion-
ality within unions, and this leads to choosing the proportional partitional Shapley
value. The reason is that, by social efficiency when computing centres of gravity
of unions, the NHM must respect the priority of bigger towns and hence the rele-
vant differences in population between the concerned towns, which are given by
the Shapley value of v. (If the Aumann–Dre`ze value were applied e.g. to partition
P = {{1,5},{2,3,4}}, it would yield 1/2 for both villages 1 and 5, and hence a
PAC at the midpoint of the segment joining them, in spite of the great difference
in population and in Shapley value.)
Thus, between 52 possible partitions of the villages, 6 of them imply no PAC,
36 give rise to one PAC, and the remaining 10 give rise to two PACs. Here are
some examples:
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• If P = {{1},{2,5},{3,4}} then no PAC is assigned.
• If P= {{1,4},{2},{3,5}} then one PAC is assigned to union {1,4} at point
G14 = (1,1).
• If P = {{1,5},{2,3,4}} then two PACs are assigned: to union {1,5} at
point G15 =(1/5, 3/5) and to union {2,3,4} at point G234 =(23/7, 8/7) (see
Fig. 1).
A B
C
DE
G15
G234
x
y
Fig. 1: Location of primary assistance centres for P = {{1,5},{2,3,4}}
Example 10 (Sharing public funds)
A specific industrial sector in a given region consists of a set N of enterprises.
The regional government wishes to give financial support to collaboration projects
endeavored by the enterprises, each one of which may remain isolated or intervene
in one project at most. Thus, the set of projects is given by (i.e. equivalent to) a
partition P of N.
The individual capabilities and the synergies derived from collaborations be-
tween the enterprises have been evaluated by the government in terms of expected
benefits by means of a cooperative game v in N. Thus, the Shapley value Φ(v) de-
scribes the relative importance of each enterprise in the sector taking into account
all possible collaborations.
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Each project Pk will be rewarded by sharing v(Pk) among the participants in
the project. Since projects cannot be combined to give rise to “superprojects”,
the Owen value is not suitable here. The alternative consists in using either the
Aumann–Dre`ze value or the proportional partitional Shapley value.
The governmental regulation establishes that the allocation to the members
of a project must take into account the relevance of each member in the sector.
The simplest way to do this consists in sharing each budget proportionally to the
Shapley value Φ(v) (for the involved enterprises), so the proportional partitional
Shapley value seems to be the suitable option.
For example, let n = 4 and assume that the individual capability (amounts
expressed in thousands of US Dollars) is given by
v({1}) = 36000, v({2}) = v({3}) = 24000, v({4}) = 18000.
Game v is completed this way: if |S| ≥ 2 then
v(S) = (1+∑
i∈S
σi)∑
i∈S
v({i}),
where σ1 = 0.15, σ2 = σ3 = 0.20 and σ4 = 0.05 are the synergy coefficients. For
example, v(N) = 163200. The Shapley value of this game is
Φ(v) = (53975,41125,41125,26975).
Assume that partition P = {{1,2},{3,4}} forms. Then the budgets to be
shared are v(P1) = 81000 and v(P2) = 52500. The proportional partitional Shap-
ley value yields
pi1(v,P)≈ 45972, pi2(v,P)≈ 35028, pi3(v,P)≈ 31704, pi4(v,P)≈ 20796,
which keeps within each union the proportionality given by Φ(v). As a matter of
comparison, the Aumann–Dre`ze value would give
α1(v,P) = 46500, α2(v,P) = 34500, α3(v,P) = 29250, α4(v,P) = 23250.
We remark that the proportional partitional Shapley value reflects the effects of
the synergy coefficients in the whole sector, whereas the Aumann–Dre`ze value
takes into account only their effects within each union.
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Example 11 (Simple games and power indices)
Values and coalitional values are often used as power indices by applying them to
simple games. These games form a subclass SG(N) of monotonic games and are
useful for describing and analyzing binary voting procedures. We will discuss a
bit the possibilities to act as power indices of the Aumann–Dre`ze value and the
proportional partitional Shapley value.
We first remark that the axiomatic characterizations of the proportional parti-
tional Shapley value established in Section 2 can be easily translated to subclass
SG(N), thus supporting the meaning of this value as a power index. Indeed, The-
orem 5 (statement and proof) applies to SG(N) without any change if the axioms
are restricted to this class. In the case of Theorem 6, only WA does not make
sense in SG(N). In the Shapley value case, additivity was successfully replaced in
Dubey (1975) with the transfer property:
Φ(v∨w)+Φ(v∧w) = Φ(v)+Φ(w) for all v,w ∈ SG(N).
Here it is only necessary to replace WA with a “weighted transfer” property. Of
course, also the proof requires some small modifications in this domain. We omit
the details.
Let v be a proper (i.e. superadditive) simple game. This means that there are
no disjoint winning coalitions. Some general rules hold for the Aumann–Dre`ze
value α: given a coalition structure P, (a) if Pk is a minimal winning coalition in
v then α(v,P) allocates 1/|Pk| to each member of Pk and 0 otherwise; (b) if Pk is
winning but not minimal winning then α allocates in all 1 unit to the members
of Pk, but the sharing depends on the minimal winning coalitions included in Pk;
(c) if Pk is not winning then all its members get 0. Only property (c) holds for
the proportional partitional Shapley value pi. The following numerical example
illustrates these assertions.
Let us consider the weighted majority game v ≡ [3;2,1,1,1]. The family
of minimal winning coalitions is W m(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{2,3,4}} and
Φ(v) = (3/6,1/6,1/6,1/6). Some partitions are studied in Table 1.
Now let v be an improper simple game. Rules (a), (b) and (c) above still hold
for the Aumann–Dre`ze value α if only one (minimal or not) winning coalition,
or none of them, appears in the partition. However, a new rule (d) says that if
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partition P α(v,P) pi(v,P)
{{1,2},{3},{4}} (1/2,1/2,0,0) (3/4,1/4,0,0)
{{1},{2,3,4}} (0,1/3,1/3,1/3) (0,1/3,1/3,1/3)
{{1,2,3},{4}} (4/6,1/6,1/6,0) (3/5,1/5,1/5,0)
{{1},{2},{3,4}} (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
Table 1: α and pi on v≡ [3;2,1,1,1]
two or more winning coalitions are unions of P then a worth of one unit is shared
in each of them. This is the main difference with the proper case. Here, the
proportional partitional Shapley value pi satisfies (c) and (d). A new numerical
example illustrates these assertions.
Let us consider now v≡ [5;4,3,2,2,1], the game of Example 9. Here
W m(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{1,5},{2,3},{2,4},{3,4,5}}
and Φ(v) = 112(4,3,2,2,1). See some partitions in Table 2.
partition P α(v,P) pi(v,P)
{{1,2},{3,4,5}} (1/6)(3,3,2,2,2) (1/35)(20,15,14,14,7)
{{1,2,3,4},{5}} (1/6)(2,2,1,1,0) (1/11)(4,3,2,2,0)
{{1,2,3},{4,5}} (1/3)(1,1,1,0,0) (1/9)(4,3,2,0,0)
{{1,5},{2,3,4}} (1/6)(3,4,1,1,3) (1/35)(28,15,10,10,7)
{{1,3},{2,4},{5}} (1/2)(1,1,1,1,0) (1/15)(10,9,5,6,0)
Table 2: α and pi on v≡ [5;4,3,2,2,1]
Our conclusion is that the Aumann–Dre`ze value is not a suitable power index:
it disregards a lot of information given by the original game and ends up being
too “drastic”. On the contrary, we contend that, precisely because of the PWU
property, the proportional partitional Shapley value looks more interesting as a
measure of coalitional power. Indeed, due to PWU, all power relationships in
the original game among players of the same union are kept after the coalition
formation process. We feel that this should please politicians, who do not like too
radical and troubling variations.
For example, in Table 1, it does not seem very reasonable that under par-
tition P = {{1,2},{3},{4}} player 1 obtains by means of α the same coali-
tional power as player 2. The same equal sharing of power would result if v ≡
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[136;130,50,50,30,10] represents a parliamentary body and P = {{1,2}, . . .},
in spite of being W m(v) = {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{1,5},{2,3,4,5}} and Φ(v) =
1
10(6,1,1,1,1). The Aumann–Dre`ze value yields here α(v,P) =
1
2(1,1,0,0,0)
whereas the proportional partitional Shapley value yields pi(v,P) = 17(6,1,0,0,0).
Formally, let i, j be any two players with weights wi,w j. It is well known
that if wi ≥ w j then Φi(v) ≥ Φ j(v). In our coalitional structure framework, and
provided that P(i) = P( j), we have: if Φi(v) ≥ Φ j(v) then αi(v,P) ≥ α j(v,P) and
pii(v,P) ≥ pi j(v,P), but the most interesting feature is that if Φi(v) > Φ j(v) and,
moreover, P(i) is winning in v, then pii(v,P)> pi j(v,P) whereas it may well happen
that αi(v,P) =α j(v,P). And this holds even in simple games that are not weighted
majority games.
Example 12 (Extension of the new value to level coalition structures)
A level coalition structure in N is a sequence of coalition structures
P = {P(0),P(1), . . . ,P(r)},
where P(0) = PN and r ≥ 1 (thus including the basic case dealt with above, which
arises for r = 1). We require that, for every h with 0 ≤ h < r, P(h+1) is a refine-
ment of P(h), that is, each member of P(h) belongs to P(h+1) or splits into smaller
pieces belonging to P(h+1). The extension of the Owen value to this new setup
was treated in Owen (1977) and Winter (1989). We wish to discuss here the pos-
sibility of extending the notion of proportional partitional Shapley value to this
more general concept of coalition structure. To this end, the coherent inductive
definition of a new value, the proportional partitional level value piP , which will
act on each level h = 1,2, . . . ,r, is as follows. If i ∈ N, 1 ≤ h ≤ r, and P(h)(i) is the
union to which i belongs in P(h),
piPi (v,P
(h)) =

piPi (v,P(h−1))
∑
j∈P(h)(i)
piPj (v,P
(h−1))
v(P(h)(i) ) if i is not a null player in v,
0 otherwise.
Coherence means that piP (v,P(1))= pi(v,P(1)). A numerical example will illustrate
the procedure. Let us take v≡ [4;5,4,3,2,1,1], where
W m(v) = {{1},{2},{3,4},{3,5},{3,6},{4,5,6}},
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and let P = {P(0),P(1),P(2)} with
P(0) = PN , P(1) = {{1,2},{3,4,5,6}}, P(2) = {{1},{2},{3,4,5},{6}}.
Then we have {1,2},{3,4,5,6},{1},{2},{3,4,5} ∈W (v) but {6} /∈W (v). The
results of applying the level value are displayed in Fig. 2.
A great difference between the Owen value and the Aumann–Dre`ze and the
proportional partitional Shapley value is that, in the latter two, the allocation
within any union is not affected by any change in other unions.
{1} {2} {3 4 5} {6}
1 1 3/5 1/5 1/5 0
{1, 2} {3, 4, 5, 6}
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
1/2 1/2 3/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
7/20 7/20 3/20 1/20 1/20 1/20
P (2)
piP [v;P (2)]
P (1)
piP [v;P (1)]
P (0)
Φ[v]
Fig. 2: Level coalition structure and level value for v≡ [4;5,4,3,2,1,1]
4 Some discussion
We include here some suplementary information. First, two axiomatic charac-
terizations of the Aumann–Dre`ze value on monotonic games using two classical
properties.8 Second, a remark supplying counterexamples to show that pi does not
8Both characterizations are valid also on G(N). We omit their proofs because they are quite
similar to the classical ones. In particular, Theorem 14 is analogous to the original characterization
of this value on G(N) (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974). The difference lies in the final part of the proof.
Regarding Theorem 13, we recall that the balanced contributions property for the Shapley value
asserts that Φi(v)−Φi(v− j) = Φ j(v)−Φ j(v−i) for all v ∈ G(N) and i, j ∈ N. Here v−k denotes
the restriction of v to N \{k} for any k ∈ N. This property was introduced and proved in Myerson
(1980).
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satisfy these properties and α does not satisfy any of NPP*, PWU and WA. Third,
two remarks on the logical independence of the axiomatic systems used in Theo-
rems 7 and 8, respectively. Finally, a summary of all properties considered in the
paper, displayed in Table 3.
Let us recall two classical coalitional properties not yet mentioned here that
we state for a partitional value φ on MG(N).
• Additivity (ADD): φ(v+w,P) = φ(v,P)+φ(w,P) for all v,w ∈ MG(N) and
P ∈ P(N).
• Balanced contributions within unions (BCWU): if P(i) = P( j) for some i, j ∈
N then, for all v ∈MG(N),
φi(v,P)−φi(v,P− j) = φ j(v,P)−φ j(v,P−i),
where, for any k ∈ N, we define
P−k = {P(k) \{k},{k}}∪{Pi : Pi ∈ P,Pi 6= P(k)}.
Theorem 13 (First axiomatic characterization of the Aumann–Dre`ze value) The
Aumann–Dre`ze value α is the unique partitional value on MG(N) that satisfies
BCWU. 
Theorem 14 (Second axiomatic characterization of the Aumann–Dre`ze value)
The Aumann–Dre`ze value α is the unique partitional value on MG(N) that satis-
fies NPP, SWU and ADD. 
Remark 15 (Properties that distinguish between pi and α)
Let n = 3, P = {{1,2},{3}}, and v,w ∈MG(N) be the glove games defined by
v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = v(N) = 1, and v(S) = 0 otherwise, and
w({1}) = w({1,2}) = w({1,3}) = w({2,3}) = 1,w(N) = 2,
and w(S) = 0 otherwise.
(i) pi does not satisfy ADD. Indeed,
pi1(v,P)+pi1(w,P) = 4/5+2/3 6= 10/7 = pi1(v+w,P).
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(ii) pi does not satisfy BCWU. In effect,
pi1(v,P)−pi1(v,P−2) = 4/5−0 6= 1/5−0 = pi2(v,P)−pi2(v,P−1).
(iii) α does not satisfy NPP* (see footnote 7). Player 2 is not null in w and
w(P(2)) 6= 0 but α2(w,P) = 0.
(iv) α does not satisfy PWU. We have α(v,PN) = Φ(v) = (2/3,1/6,1/6) and
α(v,P) = (1/2,1/2,0), so
α1(v,P)α2(v,PN) = 1/12 6= 1/3 = α2(v,P)α1(v,PN).
(v) α does not satisfy WA. It is easily checked that
hα1 (v,P)+hα1 (w,P) = 5/12+3/2 6= 7/4 = hα1 (v+w,P).
Remark 16 (Independence of the axiomatic system in Theorem 7)
(i) The value φ1 defined for all v ∈MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N by
φ1i (v,P) =

βi(v)
∑ j∈P(i) β j(v)
v(P(i)) if i is not a null player in v,
0 otherwise,
where β denotes the Banzhaf value (Owen, 1975), satisfies NPP and PWU
and is a partitional value but not a partitional Shapley value.
(ii) The Aumann–Dre`ze value α is a partitional Shapley value on MG(N) that
satisfies NPP but not PWU.
(iii) As N = {1,2, . . . ,n}, for any nonempty subset S ⊆ N we can consider the
minimum and maximum members of S according to the ordering of natural
numbers. Let us consider the partitional value φ2 defined on MG(N) as
follows. For any (v,P), if P 6= PN and there exists Pk ∈ P with |Pk|> 1 and
all i ∈ Pk are null in v then, for each i ∈ Pk,
φ2i (v,P) =

−1 if i = minPk,
1 if i = maxPk,
0 otherwise,
while, in any other case, φ2i (v,P) = pii(v,P) for all i ∈ Pk. This value is a
partitional Shapley value that satisfies PWU but not NPP.
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Remark 17 (Independence of the axiomatic system in Theorem 8)
(i) Let us consider for n= 3 the game w defined by w( /0) =w({1}) =w({2}) =
w({3}) = w({1,2}) = 0, w({1,3}) = 1, w({2,3}) = w(N) = 2, partition
Q = {{1,2},{3}}, and numbers τ1 = −1, τ2 = 1, τ3 = 0. We define φ3 on
MG(N) by
φ3i (v,P) =
{
τi if (v,P) = (w,Q),
pii(v,P) otherwise.
φ3 is a partitional value that satisfies NPP, SWU and WA but not NN.
(ii) The value φ4 defined for all v ∈MG(N), P ∈ P(N) and i ∈ N by
φ4i (v,P) =
v
(
P(i)
)∣∣P(i)∣∣
is a partitional value that satisfies NN, SWU and WA but not NPP.
(iii) Let ω = (ω1,ω2) be a weighting vector such that ω1 6= ω2 and Φω be the
corresponding weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet, 1987). The parti-
tional value φ5 on MG(N) defined by
φ5i (v,P) =
{
Φω(v) if n = 2 and P = PN ,
pii(v,P) otherwise
satisfies NN, NPP and WA but not SWU.
(iv) The Aumann–Dre`ze value α is a partitional value on MG(N) that satifies
NN, NPP and SWU but not WA.
All properties considered in this paper are shown in Table 3.
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properties A–D value PPS value
α pi
efficiency no no
local efficiency
(partitional value) OK OK
partitional Shapley value (PN) OK OK
nonnegativity (NN) OK OK
null player property (NPP) OK OK
null player strong property (NPP*) no OK
symmetry within unions (SWU) OK OK
balanced contributions
within unions (BCWU) OK no
proportionality
within unions (PWU) no OK
additivity (ADD) OK no
weighted additivity (WA) no OK
Table 3: Comparison of properties for α and pi
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